he rise of human rights as an international issue in the later half of the 20th century presents a puzzle for students of comparative politics and international relations. Many of our dominant theories-realism, rational choice, and economic interest group theories-have trouble accounting for the rise of human rights politics except to dismiss them as marginal, insignificant, or an ideological cover beneath which economic groups or hegemonic countries pursue their interests. But as the other essays here and the daily newspapers make abundantly clear, human rights issues are not marginal, and increasingly detailed policy and institutional mechanisms exist to ensure the implementation of international human rights standards. In some cases, these policies can have a direct impact on human rights practices, and have contributed to reduced repression and regime changes (see Sikkink 1993; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink forthcoming).
As ing of human rights in international perspective, and yet the discipline has, for the most part, ignored or marginalized human rights as a research topic. One reason may be that the dominant theories in the discipline do not give us the tools to understand the emergence of human rights as a crucial international issue area, nor the impact human rights ideas and policies can have upon state practices.
The emergence of human rights politics pushes us to explain why such policies emerge, and why these policies sometimes lead to significant domestic changes. Virtually any explanation of the rise of human rights must take into account the political power of norms and ideas and the increasingly transnational way in which those ideas are carried and diffused. In order to understand how human rights policies can lead to domestic change, in addition, we need to understand how those ideas get translated into political and economic pressures brought to bear on repressive countries and how such pressures contribute to opening space for domestic opposition, and often to redemocratization.
Understanding these changes are particularly important because human rights are not just another one among the many issue areas in political science today. Because international human rights norms question state rule over society and national sovereignty, human rights issues offer particularly potent challenges to the central logic of a system of sovereign states, as Hedley Bull recognized in his classic work, The Anarchical Society:
Carried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organised as a society of sovereign states. For, if the rights of each man can be asserted on the world political stage over and against the claims of his state, and his duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as a servant or a citizen of that state, then the position of the state as a body sovereign over it citizens, and entitled to command their obedience, has been subject to challenge, and the structure of the society of sovereign states has been placed in jeopardy. There are a series of hypotheses in the literature about the conditions under which norms will be influential. The hegemonic socialization approach suggests that in order to explain which norms will be influential, we examine which norms are most forcefully espoused by hegemonic actors (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). This explanation, however, fails to account for how normative change occurs within the hegemon. Nor is it the case that all major human rights victories were the result of hegemonic pressures. There are crucial episodes of human rights changes, such as women's suffrage, or the global campaign against apartheid, where hegemons were followers, not leaders (Klotz 1995; Ramirez et al. 1997).
Another explanation for the spread of norms is that norms entrenched at the domestic level (not just in the hegemon but in a wide range of states) are projected internationally. Lumsdaine (1993) provides extensive documentation for the argument that norms about foreign aid have their roots in domestic antipoverty norms and are in many ways an international projection of the welfare state. While international human rights norms clearly resulted from the internationalization of domestic human rights norms, this explanation cannot explain why the internationalization of norms may follow the domestic normative process by centuries (in the sense that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 extended to the international arena rights granted to French citizens in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789) while in other cases the internationalization follows much more directly. There is some evidence, however, of increasing simultaneity of domestic and international normative processes. For example, domestic and global campaigns for the elimination of do-mestic battery and violence against women are evolving together in many cases, with international normative developments used to spur domestic change and vice versa. This raises the issue of which domestic norms can be successfully internationalized. Many domestic norms do not lend themselves to easy internationalization, while others seems easier to project onto an international arena.
Forsythe ( have advanced more specific claims. We argue that two broad categories of norms are particularly effective transnationally and cross-culturally: those involving bodily integrity and prevention of bodily harm for vulnerable or "innocent" groups, especially when there is a short causal chain between cause and effect; and norms for legal equality of opportunity. Norms entrepreneurs must speak to aspects of belief systems or life worlds that transcend a specific cultural or political context. Although notions of bodily harm are culturally interpreted, they also resonate with basic ideas of human dignity common to most cultures. If one basic motivation for espousing norms is empathy, then we would expect transcultural norms to be based on a basic human denominator that would provoke empathy. But issues involving bodily harm don't develop into international norms cascades in and of themselves. Bringing these issues to the fore requires the efforts of international norm entrepreneurs capable of drawing them to the attention of policymakers and the public. For example, transnational norms entrepreneurs, organized in advocacy networks, have successfully used graphic images of bodily harm as a means of mobilizing transnational campaigns against human rights violations in particular countries. What this argument about the intrinsic power of the issue suggests is that not all human rights norms are equal, and that we would expect some human rights norms to gain wide international acceptance more rapidly than others.
In summary, international relations theorists hoping to understand the politics of human rights will need a different model of international politics; one that sees the international system as an international society made up not only of states, but also of non-state actors that may have transnational identities and overlapping loyalties. While states continue to be the primary actors in this system, their actions need to be understood not as self-help behavior in anarchy, but as the actions of members of an international society of states and non-state actors. In such a society, states may make changes in their behavior not only because of the economic costs of sanctions, but because leaders of countries care about what leaders of other countries think of them. As James Fearon (1997) discussed, people sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and because they want to think well of themselves. People's ability to think well of themselves is influenced by norms held by a relevant community of actors. International law scholars have long recognized this inter-subjective nature of norms by referring to international law as relevant within a community of "civilized nations." Today, the idea of "civilized" nations has gone out of style, but international law and international organizations are still the primary vehicles for stating community norms and for conferring collective legitimation. Some legal scholars now discuss a community of "liberal states," seen as a sphere of peace, democracy, and human rights, and distinguish between relations among liberal states and those among liberal and nonliberal states (Slaughter 1995). Human rights norms have constitutive effects because good human rights performance is one crucial signal to others to identify a member of the community of liberal states. Political scientists need to be especially attentive to the politics of human rights not only because of their potential for promoting human dignity, but also because human rights issues are particularly useful cases for generating and exploring alternative models of international politics (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink fothcoming). No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6.
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
Article 7.
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8.
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10.
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 11.
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.
Article 12.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Article 13.
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Article 14.
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
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